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ABSTRACT 6 
The EU broiler Directive came into force in the UK in June 2010 with the aim of setting new 7 
minimum standards, monitoring broiler welfare and addressing any welfare problems. A survey 8 
questionnaire was used to elicit information from a stratified sample of citizens in England and 9 
Wales regarding their willingness to pay for the provisions of the Directive, as an estimate of the 10 
consumer surplus associated with the legislation. We also explore the usefulness of Prelec’s 11 
(2004) Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) in promoting respondents’ truthful reporting. A median 12 
willingness to pay of £21.5 per household per year (corrected for sample bias and possible ‘yea 13 
saying’) was estimated from 665 responses. This provides an estimated benefit of the legislation 14 
to citizens of over £503 million/yr, equivalent to 5.3% of current consumer expenditure on 15 
chicken. This compares to an estimated £22 million per annum cost of producers’ compliance 16 
and government enforcement associated with the legislation. No statistically significant 17 
differences in responses between respondents that did and did not have a BTS incentive to 18 
answer questions truthfully were found, which might reflect apparently truthful answers in this 19 
case, an insufficiently strong financial incentive or a weakened effect due to an element of 20 
disbelief in the BTS amongst the sample. The analysis suggests that the benefits of the broiler 21 
Directive to citizens greatly outweigh the additional costs to producers, making a case for the 22 
legislation to be retained. 23 
 24 
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The benefits of farm animal welfare legislation: the case of the EU broiler 28 
directive and truthful reporting 29 
1. Introduction 30 
Legislation has been a major policy instrument for the protection of animal welfare in Europe with 31 
many European Union (EU) regulations and directives implemented in the last 20 years (Bennett 32 
and Appleby, 2011; European Commission, 2016). In 2007 new EU rules were agreed (Council 33 
Directive 2007/43/EC) for protecting the welfare of broiler chickens (European Commission, 34 
2007). The broiler Directive came into force in the United Kingdom (UK) on 30 June 2010. When 35 
such legislation is introduced there is an expectation that the benefits of that legislation will be 36 
greater than the costs. Expected costs include costs to government, for administration, monitoring 37 
and enforcement, as well as compliance costs for producers and broader industry and national costs 38 
associated with impacts on competitiveness, international trade and economic output. Expected 39 
benefits of such legislation are generally non-monetary, but include consumer perceptions of 40 
enhanced chicken meat quality and enhancement of consumer and citizens levels of satisfaction 41 
from knowing that the welfare of broiler chickens is better protected in the food production process 42 
(see Mayfield et al., 2007 in relation to consumer attitudes to animal welfare in Europe). Indeed, 43 
a UK government ex ante Impact Assessment (IA) published in 2010 (Defra, 2010) concluded that 44 
while the broiler Directive would lead to some costs to producers, this would be more than off-set 45 
by non-market benefits to consumers, in the form of higher broiler welfare, for which many would 46 
be willing to pay. We test the hypothesis that citizens have an additional willingness to pay (WTP) 47 
for the broiler Directive beyond any price increase as a result of increased costs of production due 48 
to the legislation and assess the scale of such benefits by means of an ex post WTP survey of 49 
citizens. Since the perceived costs of improving animal welfare can deter legislation it is important 50 
to estimate the benefits of legislation to better inform policy. In addition, as a methodological 51 
contribution, we explore the usefulness of Prelec’s (2004) Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) which is 52 
designed to reduce respondents’ misreporting (i.e. help ensure ‘truthful’ reporting) in surveys.  53 
 54 
Theoretically, the WTP we estimate using the CV method is a Hicksian consumer surplus measure 55 
(see Mitchell and Carson, 1989 p25) which can be interpreted as a respondent’s maximum WTP 56 
for the broiler legislation and its provisions (considered, at least in part, as a public good, because 57 
some of the benefits accruing from the legislation are non-excludable and non-divisible/non-rival). 58 
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Our WTP estimate measures both use and non-use value and, as noted by Zhao and Kling (2004), 59 
is defensible theoretically as a welfare measure that can be directly applied to cost-benefit analysis. 60 
 61 
Section 2 covers the background of WTP in the area of animal health and welfare and associated 62 
legislation along with a description of the broiler Directive and its implementation in the United 63 
Kingdom. Section 3 outlines the WTP survey whilst Section 4 covers the analytical methods. 64 
Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 discusses them. Section 7 offers some conclusions. 65 
 66 
2. Background 67 
 68 
WTP applied to animal health and welfare 69 
Although widely used in other areas, stated preference valuation methods have perhaps been less 70 
widely applied to animal welfare. Bennett et al. (2011) provide a review and critique of valuation 71 
studies applied to animal welfare. Lagerkvist and Hess (2011) identify 24 stated preference 72 
studies of people’s WTP in relation to animal welfare, yielding 106 WTP estimates, in their 73 
meta-analysis.  Approximately half of these are contingent valuation studies and half use a 74 
choice experiment approach (with one other using an experimental auction method). 75 
Additionally, Clark et al. (2016) observed just 17 WTP studies out of some 80 studies included 76 
in their systematic review of public attitudes, perceptions and behaviours towards animal welfare 77 
concerns arising from livestock production diseases.  78 
 79 
A common feature of these studies is that they elicit WTP from citizens regarding specific 80 
changes in husbandry or other practices to improve welfare, although Bennett et al. (2012) 81 
present a method for the economic valuation of animal welfare benefits more generally using a 82 
single welfare score. WTP values can be used as estimates of the likely magnitude of the benefits 83 
that citizens obtain from each of these animal husbandry or other measures. It is clear from a 84 
number of the studies reviewed that consumers value animal welfare not only for ethical reasons 85 
but also in some cases because they believe that products from animals with higher welfare are 86 
of higher quality in terms of taste, nutrition and safety and better for the environment (despite 87 
there being little empirical evidence to support the validity of these beliefs). 88 
 89 
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The broiler Directive and its implementation in the UK 90 
While one of the purposes of the broiler Directive is to promote more universal achievement of 91 
minimum animal welfare standards across EU members states (MS), a number of 92 
implementation options are permitted, including variation in the maximum stocking density 93 
limits that can be applied in each MS. In the UK producers have been permitted to choose from 94 
among two stocking density maxima:  95 
i) stocking up to 33kg live weight per m2 is permitted if specific standards are met for drinkers, 96 
feeding, litter, ventilation and heating, noise, light, inspections, cleaning, record keeping, training 97 
and surgical interventions.  98 
ii) stocking beyond 33kg per m2 up to 38kg/m2 is permitted if an additional set of standards are 99 
met (the Annex II requirements). These include notification and documentation requirements, 100 
plus further controls on environmental parameters in broiler housing. 101 
 102 
In addition, the Directive requires the collection of data from farms on cumulative daily 103 
mortality (CDM) and data from slaughterhouses for eight post-mortem measures of body 104 
condition (collectively known as the ‘trigger conditions’) to help identify poor welfare on 105 
farms. These data, which relate to each batch of birds per farm sent to slaughter, are used 106 
by the Food Standards Agency (FSA) and the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) to 107 
identify farms which may require problem notification and/or on-site inspection. The post-108 
mortem body condition measures for which data are collected are: 1) ascites/oedema, 2) 109 
cellulitis and dermatitis, 3) dead on arrival, 4) emaciation, 5) joint lesions/arthritis, 6) 110 
septicaemia/respiratory problems, 7) total carcase rejections and 8) foot pad dermatitis 111 
score. Evaluation of these data involves two processes: 112 
Process 1: An alert (to APHA) is triggered if the incidence of any of the individual post-113 
mortem conditions is exceptionally high in any batch (defined as greater than six standard 114 
deviations above the mean); 115 
Process 2: An alert is triggered if the CDM is unusually high (defined as greater than three 116 
standard deviations above the mean) and, additionally, the level of three or more of the 117 
post-mortem conditions is high (defined as above the mean). 118 
 119 
When trigger thresholds are breached, the keeper of the animals and APHA are alerted by 120 
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means of a ‘trigger report’. APHA and FSA have inspection regimes and data handling 121 
systems to communicate information relating to poor welfare between the slaughterhouse 122 
and the producer. Investigative action will be taken by APHA Veterinary Officers, and this 123 
may include requesting a written action plan to remedy the problem from producers and/or 124 
a visit to the production site. APHA may, in addition, carry out a number of random 125 
welfare inspections. 126 
 127 
Thus, under the broiler Directive, new broiler production standards are set and enforced 128 
through a system which continuously monitors key welfare indicators, linked to an 129 
intervention process to deal with problems should they occur. In 2013/14 the percentage of 130 
batches sent for slaughter in GB which exceeded Trigger 1 levels varied from less than 131 
0.2% for joint and arthritis problems to 1.8% for foot pad dermatitis (Food Standards 132 
Agency, personal communication). 133 
 134 
3. The Survey 135 
Questionnaire design and survey administration 136 
A questionnaire was designed which contained an introduction explaining the nature of the 137 
survey and its purpose, followed by questions to respondents with regards to their: 138 
1. Personal characteristics (sample stratification variables); 139 
2. Current consumption of chicken meat; 140 
3. Attitudes towards farmed-animal welfare; 141 
4. WTP for farmed-animal welfare improvements in general; 142 
5. Attitudes towards the broiler Directive; 143 
6. WTP for the Directive and debriefing questions to explain respondents’ WTP responses; 144 
7. Socio-demographic characteristics (non-stratification variables). 145 
 146 
A specimen copy of the questionnaire can be found in the online Appendix, available at the 147 
publisher’s website. Two versions of the questionnaire were designed in relation to those who did, 148 
and did not, consume chicken. Chicken consumers were asked how much extra they would be 149 
willing to pay for the Directive in the form of a premium on the price of the conventionally reared 150 
chicken products that they purchased, while non-chicken eaters were asked their WTP as an 151 
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additional sum on their income tax. The survey was carried out by means of a web-based 152 
questionnaire hosted by the commercial research support company Qualtrics 153 
(http://www.qualtrics.com). The questionnaire was sent to a Qualtrics-secured panel of the general 154 
public in England and Wales. A stratification procedure was applied during recruitment of survey 155 
participants to ensure that the sample was broadly representative of populations in England and 156 
Wales. This required set proportions across geographic area, age and income, based on population 157 
distributions from data from the Office of National Statistics (ONS).2 Respondents were screened 158 
to ensure that they were the primary, or regular, purchaser of food for their household. 159 
 160 
Respondent WTP was elicited using a contingent valuation (CV) payment card with a discrete 161 
dichotomous choice format with multiple increasing values akin to a ‘bidding game’ (see, for 162 
example, Heinzen and Bridges, 2008, who compare four different CV elicitation methods).   The 163 
payment card method is regarded as efficient, robust and reliable (see, for example, Bateman, et 164 
al, 2002; Pearce and Ozdemiroglu, 2002), and was considered the most appropriate WTP 165 
elicitation method for our purposes. We sought people’s holistic WTP for a single specified 166 
legislative intervention rather than valuation of different attributes of the legislation where a choice 167 
experiment approach would have been more appropriate. Our hypothesis was that people would 168 
have a willingness to pay in addition to current market prices of chicken meat to retain the 169 
legislation up to the point where their consumer surplus is zero. After reminding respondents that 170 
they have a limited household budget and that additional money spent on supporting the chicken 171 
legislation may mean that they have less money to spend on other things, respondents were 172 
presented with a range of seven bids, of ascending value, from ‘5 pence per week extra’ to ‘more 173 
than £4 per week extra’. These bids were expressed as an additional amount that respondents would 174 
pay per week, either in the form of an increase in the price of chicken meat, or taxation for those 175 
relative few who did not consume chicken3. The range of amounts chosen was based on findings 176 
                                                          
2 Despite this, some over-recruitment was found in certain socio-demographic groups requiring adjustment 
described later in the Results section. The questionnaire was pre-tested by the research team on a small number of 
consumers, and then formally piloted by Qualtrics using a panel of 50 consumers. The survey was officially 
launched on 30 September 2014 and was closed on 8 October 2014, by which time 665 usable responses had been 
received. In order to eliminate the possibility of partially completed questionnaires, respondents were required to 
complete all questions before they could file their return. 
3 A zero amount was not presented to respondents at this point because (i) respondents could answer ‘No’ to all 
the bids presented to them including the lowest 5 pence per week bid and (ii) a previous question had already 
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of pre-testing of the questionnaire and was later confirmed to be appropriate in the pilot. 177 
Respondents were asked to tick ‘Yes’ if they would be willing to pay each amount or ‘No’ if they 178 
would not. Respondents were asked to state their WTP to support the Directive and its associated 179 
provisions, taken as a whole. Respondents were also asked to indicate how they thought other 180 
people would respond to the WTP questions. 181 
 182 
Misreporting and the Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) 183 
Prelec (2004) proposed the BTS as a general mechanism to encourage ‘truth telling’ in a variety 184 
of contexts, from answering simple ‘yes or no’ questions to more complex WTP studies. There 185 
has been growing recognition of the BTS as a potential incentive mechanism for accurate reporting 186 
across a range of survey types (e.g. John et al, 2012; Weaver and Prelec, 2013). Incentives to 187 
accurate reporting may be worth using where respondents believe (perhaps falsely) that there may 188 
be real consequences induced by the findings of a survey and so there is the potential for the 189 
hypothetical survey to be ‘incentive incompatible’ (i.e. for respondents to misreport their true 190 
preferences; see Hurwicz, 1972 p.320), and also where reporting accurately is costly in terms of 191 
time or cognitive effort or where respondents have little incentive to answer carefully and honestly. 192 
 193 
The aim of the BTS approach is to elicit truthful (i.e. honest and carefully considered) subjective 194 
data in situations where the objective truth is unknowable. The method uses an information 195 
scoring system that is thought to elicit truthful answers from a sample of rational expected-value-196 
maximizing respondents (Prelec, 2004). It has been claimed that the approach can eliminate bias 197 
common in contingent valuation studies when applied to responses pertaining to the respondent’s 198 
contribution to a public good (Weaver and Prelec, 2013). The BTS can be described as follows. 199 
People are asked a question (e.g. would you be prepared to pay an additional amount for 200 
legislation x?). Additionally, they are asked to estimate what proportion of people (in general) 201 
they think would give a particular response. Both these responses contribute to a formula made 202 
known to the respondent, which integrates their responses with the responses of other individuals 203 
asked the same questions. The BTS theorem contends that if individuals provide personally 204 
truthful answers then expected scores are maximized. Respondents are then incentivised (usually 205 
                                                          
asked respondents whether they would be likely to be willing to pay something for the legislation on a five-point 
scale (Definitely yes, Possibly yes, Not sure, Probably not, Definitely not). 
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monetarily) to get a higher score. The precise nature of the formula is shown in the online 206 
Appendix, available at the publisher’s website. The formula assigns high scores to respondents’ 207 
personal answers that are more common across the sample than collectively predicted by all 208 
respondents when asked how they think others would respond (i.e. what proportion of people 209 
generally would give a particular response). For example, an answer shared by 10% of all 210 
respondents compared to a prediction of 5% would be surprisingly common and receive a high 211 
score. The assumption is that people tend to believe that the proportion of responses that 212 
correspond to their own response will be higher than the mean proportional responses elicited 213 
from the whole sample. By rewarding people for giving ‘surprisingly common’ responses truth 214 
telling is thus encouraged. 215 
 216 
Half of the respondents were given a Bayesian Truth Serum Incentive (BTSI) statement to see if 217 
it had an impact on their reporting (see Weaver and Prelec, 2013 for other examples of such 218 
statements). The BTSI statement read: “Please note that one person will be chosen at random in a 219 
prize draw to receive up to £100. The exact amount of the prize will be determined by the winner’s 220 
Truth Score (the higher the score the higher the prize amount). The Truth Score is a measure 221 
recently developed and published in the academic journal Science 222 
(http://nel.mit.edu/pdf/17BayesianTruthSerumcopy.pdf). Even though only you know how 223 
truthful your answers are, people who consider the questions carefully, answer honestly and take 224 
care to avoid mistakes score higher on the Truth Score and provide more reliable information for 225 
the survey.” For the BTS to work, respondents are not required to understand the mathematics of 226 
the scoring nor the theory behind the BTS. However, they must believe that the method rewards 227 
truth telling on average. If the BTSI had an impact, this should manifest itself as a difference in 228 
the responses of incentivised vs non-incentivised individuals. 229 
 230 
4. Estimation and inference 231 
In addition to descriptive statistics, the principle method used within the study to estimate WTP 232 
is a Bayesian Interval Regression model specified under two different assumptions concerning 233 
the error distribution, i.e. the log-Normal and the Normal. 234 
 235 
The two models are both of the standard linear form: 236 
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 237 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝐵𝑇𝑆𝐼𝑖 + 𝑐𝑍𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖   (1) 238 
 239 
and 240 
 241 
ln (𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖) = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝐵𝑇𝑆𝐼𝑖 + 𝑐𝑍𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖   (2) 242 
 243 
where  244 
𝐵𝑇𝑆𝐼𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑆𝑇𝐼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 245 
𝑍𝑖  𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖 246 
𝑒𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝜎
2. 247 
 248 
The models were estimated with and without b= 0 imposed, but we only present the full models 249 
below (in Table 4 which also outlines the covariates used) since all other coefficients were 250 
virtually the same with and without this restriction. The interval regression assumes that in either 251 
case the error is normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance. Interval regression is 252 
used to model dependent variables that have interval censoring. That is, each observation is 253 
known to lie within a range, but is potentially unobserved within that range. The upper and lower 254 
ranges can be bounded or unbounded, and if some of the values of some dependent variables are 255 
known exactly, then they can be treated as exact. An option to run interval regressions now exists 256 
for many packages including SAS, R, Gretl, and Stata.  A full description of the interval model 257 
can be found in Stewart (1983). This model is the same whether it is estimated using a Classical 258 
or Bayesian approach. The former would map the likelihood function as expressed in Stewart 259 
(1983) and the latter can map the posterior (proportional to the likelihood multiplied by a weak 260 
prior) using any number of MCMC (Markov chain Monte Carlo) algorithms. The MCMC 261 
algorithms used here were coded from first principles in the GAUSS mathematical and statistical 262 
system software. Since WTP is only observed as an interval with an upper and lower bound (l.u), 263 
the WTP or lnWTP is treated as a latent variable with a conditional mean and variance as in the 264 
regressions above. Although the Bayesian model was used here with non-informative priors, the 265 
results will be virtually identical to those obtained using a Classical approach (Stewart, 1983). 266 
The log-Normal model is preferred in this case, given that the distribution of WTP estimates (as 267 
averages of the intervals) are clearly of a log-Normal type. However, as will be shown, the key 268 
conclusions of the analysis largely remain invariant to this model preference.  269 
 270 
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The impact of the BTSI on responses was examined in two ways. First, a test was applied to see 271 
whether the BTS scores of the incentivised group differed from the non-incentivised group. 272 
Then, the WTP distributions were examined to see if they were different across the two 273 
populations using an interval regression model with a BTSI dummy variable. The significance of 274 
this dummy variable would indicate whether incentivising participants had an impact on 275 
respondents’ behaviour. In conducting this component normally distributed WTPs and log-276 
Normal WTPs were allowed in order to see whether the results were robust to distributional 277 
assumptions. 278 
 279 
5. Results 280 
Descriptive statistics 281 
Table 1 contains a summary of descriptive statistics for the sample of 665 responses. The sample 282 
contained 55% males and 45% females, with respondents living in households of 2.2 people on 283 
average, of whom 0.4 were under 16 years of age. Average household income was £33,500. Fifty-284 
nine percent of respondents reported living in rural settings, i.e. in either villages or provincial 285 
towns, with 41% stating that they lived in urban areas. Nearly 16% of respondents reported being 286 
members of an organisation concerned with the welfare of animals such as the RSPCA or RSPB4.  287 
 288 
Table 1 –Descriptive statistics for the survey sample 289 
Description Value(s) 
Total sample size 665 
Gender Male (55%); Female (45%) 
Age distribution (by group) <40 (26.8%); 40-59 (32.6%) 60+ (40.6%) 
Average household size (persons) 2.2 
Average number of children in households <16 years 0.4 
Average household income (£ p.a.) 33,500 
                                                          
4 This percentage would appear relatively high but it is likely that respondents interpreted this question quite 
widely including a range of organisations and relatively lax definitions of what constitutes membership. This 
percentage was adjusted downwards to 5% when accounting for sampling bias as described below. 
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Percentage of rural residents 59% 
Percent of respondents who are members of an 
organisation concerned with the welfare of animals 
16% 
Percentage of respondents who were vegetarians 2.5% 
Percentage of respondents who consumed chicken 94.9% 
Consumption of meals (from all sources) containing 
chicken (number of meals / week) 
1-2 (51.5%); 3-7 (43.2%); 7+ (5.3%) 
Weekly spend on chicken (all sources) (£ /week / 
household) 
0-£4.99 (37%); £5-£14.99 (54.5%); £15+ 
(8.5%) 
Percent of sample making regular purchases of free-
range chicken 
22.9% 
 290 
Almost 95% of respondents reported being consumers of chicken. Just under half of those who did 291 
not consume chicken stated their reason as being vegetarianism. Respondents consuming chicken 292 
reported eating an average of 3.05 meals per week containing chicken (mode 1-2; includes 293 
takeaways and meals out), with a range from one to 15. Respondents reported spending a modal 294 
value of £5-£10 per week (mean £7.8) on chicken purchases for their household, excluding 295 
takeaway meals and meals eaten outside the home (respondents were asked to select from 296 
categories for their response, which ranged from zero to more than £20 per week). Chicken from 297 
conventional production systems was by far the most common purchase, with free-range chicken 298 
regularly purchased by just 23% of the sample. Fifty-six percent of the sample reported purchasing 299 
free-range chicken meat only occasionally and 21% never purchased it. 300 
 301 
Respondents were asked to rank their concern for farmed animals against a number of other widely 302 
held concerns, such as those in relation to the environment. Chicken eaters are most concerned 303 
about food safety, with animal welfare concerns near to last. Non-chicken eaters place food safety 304 
concerns last, but, again, animal welfare concerns are low in the order of priorities (‘healthy diet’ 305 
was ranked first). Respondents were asked to rank their level of concern for the welfare of broiler 306 
chickens reared in the UK on a scale of 0-10, where 0 = not concerned at all and 10 = very 307 
concerned. The sample average rank was 8.2, with chicken eaters scoring insignificantly higher 308 
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than non-chicken eaters, i.e. 8.6 compared to 8.2. There were significant age differences in ranking 309 
of concern, with older respondents ranking concern more highly (F=3.53, p=0.0147). 310 
 311 
WTP elicitation 312 
Respondents were asked to indicate the maximum sum that they would be willing to pay per 313 
week as an additional amount on the cost of their chicken meat purchases (or, in the case of non-314 
chicken eaters, as an increase in taxation) to support the broiler legislation. Figure 1 shows the 315 
distribution of WTP responses. Those classified as zero in Figure 1 are those who responded 316 
‘No’ to the lowest WTP amount offered to them (5p per week extra) and may therefore include 317 
those with a non-zero but low (i.e. less than 5p) WTP. In the estimation of WTP, in the case of 318 
the unlogged data, the latent variables for those saying they would not pay the smallest possible 319 
amount (5p) are truncated above by the smallest possible values in the survey (5p), and this 320 
allows potentially negative WTPs. For the logged version, the logged WTP is truncated above 321 
the log of the smallest possible value, except by construction the latent WTPs will (when being 322 
anti-logged i.e. taking the exponential of the log WTP) imply positive though negligible WTPs. 323 
 324 
Respondents were asked a number of debriefing questions to explore the reasons for their stated 325 
WTP, and test the rationality of responses. These questions presented a number of propositional 326 
statements and respondents had to express their level of agreement with each, using an 11-point 327 
scale where 0 = ’does not reflect my views at all’ and 10 = ‘reflects my views completely’ (see 328 
Table 2). Respondents were first asked to indicate whether they understood the information 329 
provided in the questionnaire about the broiler legislation. The mean sample rank score was 8.7, 330 
indicating a high level of agreement. When asked whether they understood the WTP question (for 331 
both payment vehicles), the great majority of respondents indicated that they did (mean score 8.9). 332 
 333 
Figure 1. Distribution of sample over bid acceptance levels (pence).  334 
 335 
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 337 
Respondents generally believed that the welfare of chickens reared for meat needed to be improved 338 
and also expressed a belief that the Directive itself would act to improve the welfare of chickens 339 
reared for meat. It is interesting to note that although the Directive was introduced in 2010 (the 340 
study outlined here was part of an ex-post appraisal of the legislation) respondents were generally 341 
not aware of the Directive (for example, all focus group participants were found to be unaware of 342 
the legislation). There was a relatively high level of agreement by respondents that their WTP 343 
values reflected their concerns about the welfare of broiler chickens. Overall, respondents tended 344 
to agree with the statement that they should not have to pay more to improve chicken welfare. As 345 
might be expected, respondents who did not eat chicken were less likely to agree with the 346 
statement. There was no significant difference on this measure between those who regularly 347 
purchased free-range chicken and those who did not, even though there was a significant difference 348 
in WTP between these groups (F=13.28, p<0.0001), with regular purchasers willing to pay 349 
£0.9/week more than those who never purchased. Perhaps surprisingly, those respondents that 350 
most strongly expressed the view that they should not have to pay more (scores of 9 and 10) did 351 
not have a significantly lower WTP (t=-0.04, p=0.9680). Finally, most of the respondents 352 
(212/59% scored between 6 and 10) who received the questionnaire version with the BTSI agreed 353 
with the statement that they believed the information provided to them about the truth score (12% 354 
scored 5 suggesting they neither believed nor did not believe the information and 14% scored 355 
between 0 and 4 suggesting they did not believe the information). 356 
 357 
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Table 2.  Responses to WTP debriefing questions, where average rank score expresses degree of 358 
agreement with propositional statements on a scale of zero to 10. 359 
 360 
Propositional statements Rank scorea 
(0–10) 
 
I understood the information provided to me 
about the legislation 
8.74  
I understood the willingness to pay questions 8.94  
The welfare of chickens reared for meat needs 
improving 
8.36  
The legislation will improve the welfare of 
chickens reared for meat 
8.05  
My WTP reflects my concern about chicken 
welfare 
7.57  
I should not have to pay more to improve chicken 
welfare 
6.63  
I believed the information provided about the 
Truth Score 
       6.23  
a Note: A rank score of 0 = ‘does not reflect my views at all’ and a rank of 10 = ‘reflects my views completely’. 361 
 362 
Table 3 shows the numbers of respondents who said that they would or would not pay something 363 
for the legislation. It shows that although the majority (63.5%) say they would pay something, 364 
103 (15.5%) individuals reported that they were either definitely not or probably not prepared to 365 
pay. Of these, 58 subsequently went on to indicate a non-zero WTP amount when asked how 366 
much they would be willing to pay. This could reflect the WTP amounts presented to them, 367 
which started at £0.05 per week (0.6% increase on stated chicken expenditure). This may have 368 
induced a positive response from respondents who otherwise might have bid nothing. However, 369 
given this apparent inconsistency in stated preferences, for those respondents who had previously 370 
indicated that they would ‘definitely not’ or ‘probably not’ be willing to pay something for the 371 
legislation, a zero WTP is assumed in the estimation of WTP below to reduce any upward bias 372 
due to ‘yea saying’. 373 
 374 
Table 3: Numbers of respondents who would be prepared to pay something for the broiler 375 
legislation 376 
  Frequency Percent 
Definitely yes (1) 154 23.2 
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Possibly yes (2) 267 40.3 
Not sure (3) 139 20.9 
Probably Not (4) 77 11.6 
Definitely Not (5) 26 3.9 
Total 663 99.9 
 377 
 378 
Regression results 379 
Table 4 gives the interval regression results for both the Normal (in the bottom panel) and log-380 
Normal (in the top panel) models as described in Equations 1 and 2. Income, membership of an 381 
organisation concerned with the welfare of animals (labelled RSPCA) and having children under 382 
16 in the household all have a significant influence on WTP in both regressions. The regressors 383 
have been demeaned so that for the Normal model the intercept can be interpreted as the mean 384 
(and median since it is a symmetric distribution) estimate of WTP at the sample mean of the 385 
descriptors.  For the log-Normal model, the mean and median WTPs are calculated from the 386 
intercept and variance of the log-Normal regression, but may still be interpreted as estimates at 387 
the sample mean of the descriptors. The preferred model is the log-Normal, given that the 388 
distribution of WTP estimates (as averages of the intervals) are clearly of a log-Normal type. 389 
 390 
Table 4. Results from Normal and log-Normal interval regressions.a,b Dependent variable is 391 
WTP.  392 
 Estimate SD Est Pseudo-t     
Log_Normal        
Intercept 3.33 0.05 65.17**     
BTSI 0.08 0.10 0.86     
ln(Income) 0.29 0.08 3.58**                                                      
ln(Age) -0.01 0.14   -0.07     
Female 0.19 0.10  1.82*     
RSPCA 0.54 0.14 3.80**     
Have Children 0.29 0.13 2.14**     
Error Variance 1.65 0.10      
Median WTP 27.97 1.43      
Mean WTP 64.11 4.52      
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Normal        
Intercept 56.43 3.07 18.34**     
BTSI 4.95 6.13 0.80     
ln(Income) 13.20 4.91 2.68**     
ln(Age) -0.71 8.50     -0.08     
Female 5.17 6.47 0.80     
RSPCA 30.51 8.55 3.56**     
Have Children 21.37 8.36 2.55**     
Error Variance 5782.59 372.53      
Mean and 
Median WTP 56.43 3.07      
     
     
     
a Asterisks * and ** denote 2-tailed significance at the 10% and 5% significance respectively. 393 
b Number of observations = 665 394 
 395 
WTP robustness checks 396 
In order to guard against ‘yea saying’, the models were re-estimated under the assumption that  397 
those respondents who had previously indicated that they would ‘definitely not’ or ‘probably 398 
not’ be willing to pay something for the legislation, had zero or even negative WTPs, even if 399 
they subsequently indicated otherwise. In addition, we corrected for bias which may have been 400 
caused by over-representation of some classes of socio-demographic stratification in the sample 401 
compared with the general population. We did this by inputting average key socio-demographic 402 
characteristics of the general population of England and Wales for 2014 (ONS, 2014a) into the 403 
preferred model and re-estimating WTP. These key characteristics are income (£27,200), age 404 
(40), gender (49.3% male), the proportion of households with children under 16 (30.3%) and an 405 
assumption that 5% of the general population were members of an organization concerned with 406 
the welfare of animals. 407 
 408 
The preferred log-Normal model with these adjustments gives an estimated mean WTP of £62.5 409 
and a median WTP of £21.5 per household per week. Differences between these values reflect 410 
the highly diffuse upper tail in the log-Normal distribution. Thus, the median estimate is 411 
considered the better measure of central tendency, as a measure of the consumer/citizen surplus 412 
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associated with the legislation5. These values compare with those of around £64 and £28 413 
respectively of the unadjusted WTP estimates from the log-Normal model shown in Table 4. 414 
 415 
However, to explore the robustness of this conclusion further the log-Normal model was re-416 
estimated assigning a zero WTP to 148 respondents who answered ‘No’ when asked (prior to 417 
informing them about the legislation) if they would be willing to pay something to improve the 418 
welfare of meat chickens but then subsequently stated a positive WTP to support the broiler 419 
legislation. These results are not shown here but are very similar to the log-Normal model results 420 
shown in Table 4 except that median WTP was estimated at £14.3 per household per week.  421 
 422 
Impact of the BTSI 423 
Before returning to the results in Table 4, it is worth noting that the mean BTS scores for 424 
incentivised individuals relative to non-incentivised individuals were 0.17 and 0.13 respectively. 425 
While the incentivised group had higher scores on average, a t-test of the difference between 426 
group scores was not statistically significant (p-value > 0.15). With respect to the group of 427 
individuals with a positive WTP, the incentivised and non-incentivised groups represented 428 
69.5% and 71.2% of these respondents respectively. A z-test for differences in proportions was 429 
again statistically insignificant (p value > 0.30).  430 
 431 
Next we return to the results in Table 4 to test for the impact of the BTSI on WTPs. As before 432 
two forms of interval regression were used, i.e. Normal and log-Normal (see Table 4). The point 433 
here is not to make a comparison of the WTP results, but to show that inference is robust to 434 
assumptions about the nature of the WTP distributions. As these are Bayesian estimates, the 435 
"Pseudo-t" values are the ratio of the estimate divided by the standard deviation of the estimate, 436 
similar to the t-statistic in classical regression. If this statistic exceeds 1.96 then it is likely that 437 
the associated regressor is having a non-zero impact on the dependent variable. The BTSI 438 
dummy indicates whether individuals have been incentivised according to the BTSI.  439 
 440 
                                                          
5 Note that the very few in the sample (34 of 665) who did not eat chicken had an average WTP of around twice 
that of chicken eaters. 
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The coefficient of BTSI can be interpreted as the increase in WTP (directly for the Normal or 441 
logged WTP for the log-Normal case) resulting from the BTSI treatment. The coefficients are 442 
positive for both the Normal (4.95) and log-Normal (0.09) cases, but given their large standard 443 
deviations, these cannot be reliably said to have a positive impact on WTP. In addition to the 444 
regression results shown in Table 4, we performed a regression for each distribution with the 445 
BTSI dummy as the sole explanatory variable, in order to test that the lack of significance for 446 
BTSI is not due to collinearity of the BTSI dummy with other regressors. Again, the coefficents 447 
of BTSI were positive but not significant. From these results, it is evident that according to either 448 
distribution there is no statistically-significant evidence that the use of the BTSI has had an 449 
impact on WTP in this case.   450 
 451 
In summary, the results show that the responses of people with respect to the truth score itself, 452 
their WTP or the propensity to give inconsistent responses are largely invariant to the BTSI. 453 
 454 
6. Discussion  455 
Our survey results indicate that people in England and Wales generally support the broiler 456 
Directive legislation and appear to have a substantial WTP to support it. WTP was found to be 457 
positively correlated with income, level of concern about chicken welfare and belief that the 458 
legislation will improve the welfare of meat chickens, as would be expected. Moreover, a large 459 
majority of respondents stated that they understood both the information provided to them about 460 
the Directive and the WTP questions they were asked to respond to. Thus, the survey instrument 461 
appeared to work well and to result in credible responses from respondents. The sample size of 462 
665 respondents meets the requirement recommended by Mitchell and Carson (1989 p. 229) for a 463 
sample size of 600 usable responses or more for estimating benefits for policy purposes. 464 
 465 
However, there are many opportunities for various types of bias within stated preference survey 466 
instruments and there is a vast literature on such biases within stated preference research, 467 
including the issue of misreporting. In the first place, since the legislation already exists, fully 468 
informed and economically rational participants would not be expected to be willing to pay 469 
anything more for what they already have and are already paying for, one way or another. 470 
However, they may be willing to pay an additional amount to retain the legislation rather than it 471 
20 
 
being removed (i.e. up to the point where their consumer surplus is zero). Harvey and Hubbard 472 
(2013) provide a critique of the elicitation of people’s WTP in relation to animal welfare together 473 
with a more general thought-provoking consideration of the application of economics to animal 474 
welfare. Emotive issues such as animal welfare are susceptible to social desirability bias, where 475 
respondents feel pressured to provide a socially desirable response (i.e. to show concern for the 476 
humane treatment of animals), which may have been provoked by some questions in our survey. 477 
We also acknowledge the possibility of starting point bias and/or range bias associated with the 478 
WTP values presented to participants (where they may feel that either the first amount or the 479 
range of amounts presented to them is some indication of the amount they should be willing to 480 
pay). In addition, ‘strategic bias’ may have been present, especially in relation to the scenario 481 
presented to respondents which described the legislation as being currently evaluated (which was 482 
true). Respondents may have felt that implementation of the legislation was under threat and may 483 
therefore have strategically over-stated their WTP to ensure that the legislation was 484 
implemented. We have used a relatively cautious approach to WTP estimation to guard against 485 
these potential biases. 486 
    487 
Otherwise, responses of individuals may be shaped (perhaps resulting in misreporting) by the way 488 
in which questions are presented (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984), the information they are 489 
presented with (Ajzen et al., 1996; Hensher, 2006), hypothetical bias (the difference between true 490 
WTP and stated WTP) including the perceived social desirability associated with questions 491 
(Nederhof, 1985) such as humane treatment of chickens in this survey, the time they are given to 492 
complete the survey (Conte et al., 2016), the length of the survey (Savage and Waldman, 2008) 493 
and so on. It is not possible to test for all possible biases, priming or other effects of survey design. 494 
Our survey instrument was carefully designed, pre-tested and piloted to minimize bias in responses 495 
and the results analysed and presented to avoid estimation bias. Responses were scrutinised in 496 
relation to their credibility, rationality and consistency to identify potential issues that might cast 497 
doubt on the validity of the survey instrument design, people’s responses to the questions and the 498 
subsequent results. Questions regarding respondents’ consumption of chicken and their attitudes 499 
toward animal and chicken welfare were placed prior to information on the Directive and 500 
elicitation of WTP to encourage respondents to think about the importance of chicken in their diets 501 
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and the importance that they give to animal and chicken welfare (e.g. in relation to other concerns 502 
such as food safety and a healthy diet). 503 
 504 
Loomis (2014) identifies and reviews both ex ante and ex post strategies for overcoming 505 
hypothetical bias in stated preference surveys. The former includes ‘consequentiality designs’ 506 
which means that the survey has some potential effect on the utility of respondents such as higher 507 
prices or taxes. This approach was used in the survey reported here together with binary, 508 
dichotomous choice question formats and compulsory payment mechanisms as recommended by 509 
Loomis (see also Carson and Groves, 2007). ‘Honesty and realism’ approaches are also 510 
recommended such as the one used in this survey which involved a request to respondents to 511 
“consider your answers to questions carefully, answer honestly and take care to avoid mistakes”. 512 
In addition, the BTSI was used to further encourage truthful responses. To reduce the possibility 513 
of hypothetical bias respondents were also reminded of their budget constraints. Loomis suggests 514 
that social desirability bias and cognitive dissonance (where respondents gain utility by responding 515 
according to perceived social norms rather than their own personal values) are reduced by having 516 
multiple bid values (with small positive amounts) as used in this survey, and by making responses 517 
impersonal and anonymous (again as used in the internet survey of this study). In addition, asking 518 
respondents what they think others would pay is a way of potentially gauging over-statement of 519 
WTP due to social desirability bias (see Lusk and Norwood, 2009) – an approach also used in this 520 
study and used as an integral part of the BTS. Ex post methods to reduce hypothetical bias 521 
identified by Loomis include reporting median WTP to minimize the effect of implausibly high 522 
WTPs, recording respondent uncertainty in relation to their WTP responses and recoding of ‘Yes’ 523 
responses as ‘No’ where there is sufficient uncertainty regarding respondents having a true positive 524 
WTP, all of which were used in this study. It is also noted that using a private good (such as chicken 525 
meat in this study) reduces hypothetical bias. Loomis warns that there is no consensus regarding 526 
the best method to correct for hypothetical bias, that measuring hypothetical bias is difficult (the 527 
analyst needs to know the true WTP) and that it is possible to over-correct for this bias and so 528 
underestimate WTP. 529 
 530 
We estimate the median WTP as a measure of the consumer surplus associated with the broiler 531 
legislation, as £21.5/household/year from the preferred log-Normal Bayesian Interval Regression 532 
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model, after correcting for bias, representing 5% of the total annual amount that respondents 533 
estimated they spent on chicken meat. Our more conservative estimate, assuming a zero WTP for 534 
those who said they would not be willing to pay more, despite subsequently providing a positive 535 
response, is £14.3 per household per week. 536 
 537 
According to the UK National Census (ONS, 2014a), there were 23.4 million households in 538 
England and Wales in 2011. Using the WTP estimate of £21.5/year from above, the aggregate 539 
amount that consumers in England and Wales would be willing to pay for the broiler Directive is 540 
£504 million/year. The more conservative estimate generates aggregate benefits of £333 million/ 541 
year. A 2014 survey of 119 commercial conventional broiler producers estimated the cost of 542 
compliance with the broiler Directive in England and Wales over the period 2010 to 2014 to be 543 
£108.4 million (current prices), an average of approximately £21.7 million per year or nearly £21.9 544 
million per year including government inspection and enforcement costs (Defra, 2017; Defra 545 
2010), implying a benefit-cost ratio of 23:1. The more conservative estimate gives a benefit-cost 546 
ratio of 15:1. Some radical changes in assumptions for both benefits and costs would be required 547 
to conclude that the costs of the legislation exceed the benefits.  548 
 549 
Prior to the introduction of the Directive, SAC Commercial Ltd (SAC, 2005) estimated that 550 
consumers in England and Wales would be willing to pay the equivalent of just under 551 
£20/household/year (2014 prices) which is similar to the estimate generated above.6 However, 552 
people’s perceptions of the value of the legislation may have been somewhat different before and 553 
after implementation of the legislation so the two estimates are not wholly comparable. 554 
 555 
With regard to the BTS, we found no statistically significant impact of the BTSI on responses to 556 
the survey. We believe this negative finding is at least as important as those studies which 557 
suggest that the BTS has an impact. While we would encourage further investigation of this 558 
approach, we believe that the literature should report cases where this technique has not 559 
demonstrably changed behaviour in addition to occasions when it has. Not to do so would lead to 560 
                                                          
6  The SAC estimate of £7.53/person/year. According to the National Census (ONS, 2014a), average household 
size in 2013 was 2.37 persons with 1.86 adults per household. Therefore, the SAC (2005) WTP estimate 
equates to £14/household/year, in 2005 prices. Adjusting for inflation (ONS, 2014b), the SAC estimate is just 
under £20/household/year. 
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a biased representation of the weight of evidence in favour of positive BTS effects (more 561 
generally, for the importance of reporting negative findings we refer readers to the debate 562 
concerning ‘priming’ (Shanks et al. 2013)). 563 
 564 
There are a number of reasons why our study may have failed to observe a significant BTSI 565 
impact. First, while there may have been misreporting by the sample, the level or nature of the 566 
incentive may not have been sufficient to alter respondent behaviour. More specifically, the 567 
incentive provided for truth telling (the ‘prize draw’) may have been too small and uncertain, 568 
with respondents perceiving only a small chance of gaining financially for ‘truth telling’ (with an 569 
unknown probability of winning because respondents did not know the number of people taking 570 
part in the prize draw). Second, although most respondents had some level of belief in the truth 571 
score there was an element of disbelief which may have reduced the impact of the BTSI across 572 
the sample. Third, irrespective of the efficacy of the incentive, there may simply have been no 573 
significant misreporting in the sample and therefore no error to correct. This effect may be the 574 
case because the perceived gravity of the issue being investigated encourages truthful reporting. 575 
It is worth noting that some previous studies which have found the BTS to be effective asked 576 
respondents to report on what might be deemed more trivial matters, for example surveys of the 577 
extent of people’s recognition of world leaders’ names and film titles (see Weaver and Prelec, 578 
2013). Arguably, the more gravity that respondents attach to the issue under investigation, the 579 
more likely respondents are to carefully consider the questions presented to them, thus reducing 580 
one potential source of misreporting. Additionally, a number of aspects of the survey and 581 
questionnaire were designed to minimise bias and reduce any potential misreporting and this 582 
may have contributed to an absence of misreporting by respondents.  583 
 584 
7. Conclusion 585 
We find that people in England and Wales have a substantial stated WTP to support legislation to 586 
monitor and improve the welfare of broiler chickens in the UK. At a societal level, the benefits 587 
of the legislation, as measured by people’s estimated WTP, greatly outweighed the costs (as 588 
estimated by a survey of broiler producers). This suggests both that the current broiler legislation 589 
was worth implementing and that it is worth continuing in the UK.  Use of a Bayesian Truth 590 
Serum Incentive (BTSI) method to encourage honest and careful responses made no statistically 591 
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significant difference in terms of people’s responses or their WTP. This finding suggests that 592 
further studies need to be undertaken to better determine the exact circumstances under which 593 
the use of the BTSI has most effect in reducing misreporting.  594 
 595 
Supporting Information 596 
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article: 597 
Appendix S1 Specimen copy of the online questionnaire 598 
Appendix S2 Specification of the Bayesian Truth Serum scoring formula 599 
 600 
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Appendix 2: BTS (Bayesian Truth Serum) scoring formula 721 
 722 
If question answers and predictions are denoted by 723 
 724 
      (1) and 725 
 726 
     (2) respectively, 727 
 728 
where xr are the answers of respondent, r to questions 1 to m and yr are the  predictions of 729 
respondent, r to questions 1 to m, then we can calculate the population endorsement frequencies, 730 
x̄k, and the (geometric) average, ȳk, of predicted frequencies as: 731 
 732 
    (3) 733 
 734 
    (4) 735 
 736 
where n is the sample size. Instead of applying a preset answer key, we evaluate answers 737 
according to their information score, which is the log-ratio of actual-to-predicted endorsement 738 
frequencies. The information score for answer k is 739 
 740 
       (5) 741 
 742 
The total score for a respondent combines the information score with a separate score for the 743 
accuracy of predictions: 744 
 745 
  746 
 747 
   (6) 748 
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 749 
 750 
(Prelec, 2004). 751 
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 753 
 754 
